Abstract-This paper considers the problem of privacypreservation in decentralized optimization, in which N agents cooperatively minimize a global objective function that is the sum of N local objective functions. We assume that each local objective function is private and only known to an individual agent. To cooperatively solve the problem, most existing decentralized optimization approaches require participating agents to exchange and disclose estimates to neighboring agents. However, this results in leakage of private information about local objective functions, which is undesirable when adversaries exist and try to steal information from participating agents. To address this issue, we propose a privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach based on proximal Jacobian ADMM via function decomposition. Numerical simulations confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization where N agents cooperatively minimize a global objective function of the following form:
where variablex ∈ R n is common to all agents, function f i : R n → R is a private local objective function of agent i. This problem has found wide applications in various domains, ranging from rendezvous in multi-agent systems [1] , support vector machine [2] and classification [3] in machine learning, source localization in sensor networks [4] , to data regression in statistics [5] , [6] .
To solve the optimization problem (1) in an decentralized manner, different algorithms were proposed in recent years, including the distributed (sub)gradient algorithm [7] , augmented Lagrangian methods (ALM) [8] , and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) as well as its variants [8] - [11] . Among existing approaches, ADMM has attracted tremendous attention due to its wide applications [9] and fast convergence rate in both primal and dual iterations [11] . ADMM yields a convergence rate of O(1/k) when the local objective functions f i are convex and a Q-linear convergence rate when all the local objective functions are strongly convex [12] . In addition, a recent work shows that ADMM can achieve a Q-linear convergence rate even when the local objective functions are only convex (subject to the constraint that the global objective function is strongly convex) [13] .
On the other hand, privacy has become one of the key concerns. For example, in source localization, participating Chunlei Zhang, Huan Gao, and Yongqiang Wang are with the department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634, USA {chunlez, hgao2, yongqiw}@clemson.edu agents may want to reach consensus on the source position without revealing their position information [14] . In the rendezvous problem, a group of individuals may want to meet at an agreed time and place [1] without leaking their initial locations [15] . In the business sector, independent companies may want to work together to complete a common business for mutual benefit but without sharing their private data [16] . In the agreement problem [17] , a group of organizations may want to reach consensus on a subject without leaking their individual opinions to others [15] .
One widely used approach to enabling privacypreservation in decentralized optimization is differential privacy [18] - [21] which protects sensitive information by adding carefully-designed noise to exchanged states or objective functions. However, adding noise also compromises the accuracy of optimization results and causes a fundamental trade-off between privacy and accuracy [18] - [20] . In fact, approaches based on differential privacy may fail to converge to the accurate optimization result even without noise perturbation [20] . It is worth noting that there exists some differential-privacy based optimization approaches which are able to converge to the accurate optimization result in the mean-square sense, e.g. [22] , [23] . However, those results require the assistance of a third party such as a cloud [22] , [23] , and therefore cannot be applied to the completely decentralized setting where no third parties exist. Encryption-based approaches are also commonly used to enable privacy-preservation [24] - [26] . However, such approaches unavoidably bring about extra computational and communication burden for real-time optimization [27] . Another approach to enabling privacy preservation in linear multi-agent networks is observabilitybased design [28] , [29] , which protects agents' information from non-neighboring agents through properly designing the weights of the communication graph. However, this approach cannot protect the privacy of adversary's direct neighbors.
To enable privacy in decentralized optimization without incurring large communication/computational overhead or compromising algorithmic accuracy, we propose a novel privacy solution through function decomposition. In the optimization literature, privacy has been defined as preserving the confidentiality of agents' states [22] , (sub)gradients or objective functions [20] , [30] , [31] . In this paper, we define privacy as the non-disclosure of agents' (sub)gradients. We protect agents' (sub)gradients because in many decentralized optimization applications, subgradients contain sensitive information such as salary or medical record [26] , [30] .
Contributions: We proposed a privacy-preserving decentralized optimization approach through function decomposition. In contrast to differential-privacy based approaches which use noise to cover sensitive information and are subject to a fundamental trade-off between privacy and accuracy, our approach can enable privacy preservation without sacrificing accuracy. Compared with encryption-based approaches which suffer from heavy computational and communication burden, our approach incurs little extra computational and communication overhead. Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II introduces the attack model and presents the proximal Jacobian ADMM solution to (1) . Then a completely decentralized privacy-preserving approach to problem (1) is proposed in Sec. III. Rigorous analysis of the guaranteed privacy and convergence is addressed in Sec. IV and Sec. V, respectively. Numerical simulation results are provided in Sec. VI to confirm the effectiveness and computational efficiency of the proposed approach. In the end, we draw conclusions in Sec. VII.
II. BACKGROUND
We first introduce the attack model considered in this paper. Then we present the proximal Jacobian ADMM algorithm for decentralized optimization.
A. Attack Model
We consider two types of adversaries in this paper: Honestbut-curious adversaries and External eavesdroppers. Honestbut-curious adversaries are agents who follow all protocol steps correctly but are curious and collect all intermediate and input/output data in an attempt to learn some information about other participating agents [32] . External eavesdroppers are adversaries who steal information through wiretapping all communication channels and intercepting messages exchanged between agents.
B. Proximal Jacobian ADMM
The decentralized problem (1) can be formulated as follows: each f i in (1) is private and only known to agent i, and all N agents form a bidirectional connected network, which is denoted by a graph G = (V, E). V denotes the set of agents, E denotes the set of communication links (undirected edges) between agents, and |E| denotes the number of communication links (undirected edges) in E. If there exists a communication link between agents i and j, we say that agent i and agent j are neighbors and the link is denoted as e i,j ∈ E if i < j is true or e j,i ∈ E otherwise. Moreover, the set of all neighboring agents of i is denoted as N i and the number of agents in N i is denoted as D i . Then problem (1) can be rewritten as
where x i is a copy ofx and belongs to agent i. Using the following proximal Jacobian ADMM [33] , an optimal solution to (1) can be achieved at each agent: 
Here, k is the iteration index, γ i > 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) are proximal coefficients, ρ is the penalty parameter, which is a positive constant scalar. λ i,j and λ j,i are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraint x i = x j , e i,j ∈ E. It is worth noting that similar to our prior work [26] , both λ i,j and λ j,i are introduced for the constraint x i = x j , e i,j ∈ E in (3)-(4) to unify the algorithm description. By setting λ
holding for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j ∈ N i . In this way, the update rule of agent i can be unified without separating i > j and i < j for j ∈ N i , as shown in (3).
The proximal Jacobian ADMM is effective in solving (1). However, it cannot protect the privacy of participating agents' gradients as states x k i are exchanged and disclosed explicitly among neighboring agents. So adversaries can easily derive ▽f i (x k i ) explicitly for k = 1, 2, . . . according to the update rules in (3) and (4) by leveraging the knowledge of γ i .
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING DECENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION
The key idea of our approach to enabling privacypreservation is to randomly decompose each f i into two parts f After the function decomposition, problem (1) can be rewritten as
and the associated augmented Lagrangian function is
where
is the augmented state. λ (7) and (8) .
Based on Jacobian update, we can solve (5) by applying the following iterations for i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
Here, similar to our prior work [26] and algorithm (3)- (4) (7)- (11) to unify the algorithm description. Next we give in detail our privacy-preserving functiondecomposition based algorithm. (9)- (11); 5) Set k to k + 1, and go to 1).
Algorithm I
Initial Setup: For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i initializes x α0 i and x β0 i , and exchanges x α0 i with neighboring agents. Then agent i sets λ α0 i,j = x α0 i − x α0 j , λ αβ0 i,i = x α0 i − x β0 i , and λ βα0 i,i = x β0 i − x α0 i . Input: x αk i , λ αk i,j , λ αβk i,i , x βk i , λ βαk i,i . Output: x α(k+1) i , λ α(k+1) i,j , λ αβ(k+1) i,i , x β(k+1) i , λ βα(k+1) i,i . 1) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i constructs f α(k+1) i and f β(k+1) i under the constraint f i = f α(k+1) i + f β(k+1) i ; 2) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i updates x α(k+1) i and x β(k+1) i according to the update rules in (7) and (8), respectively; 3) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i sends x α(k+1) i to neighboring agents; 4) For all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , agent i computes λ α(k+1) i,j , λ αβ(k+1) i,i and λ βα(k+1) i,i according to
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we rigorously prove that each agent's gradient of local objective function ▽f j cannot be inferred by honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1: In Algorithm I, agent j's gradient of local objective function ▽f j at any point except the optimal solution will not be revealed to an honest-but-curious agent i.
Proof: Suppose that an honest-but-curious adversary agent i collects information from K iterations to infer the gradient ▽f j of a neighboring agent j. The adversary agent i can establish 2nK equations relevant to ▽f j by making use of the fact that the update rules of (7) and (8) are publicly known, i.e., It is worth noting that after the optimization algorithm converges, adversary agent i can have another piece of information according to the KKT conditions [33] :
If agent j's neighbors are also neighbors to agent i, the exact gradient of f j at the optimal solution can be inferred by an honest-but-curious agent i. Therefore, agent j's gradient of local objective function ▽f j will not be revealed to an honest-but-curious agent i at any point except the optimal solution. Corollary 1: In Algorithm I, agent j's gradient of local objective function ▽f j at any point except the optimal solution will not be revealed to external eavesdroppers.
Proof: The proof can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning of Theorem 1. External eavesdroppers can also establish a system of 2nK equations (12) to infer agent j's gradient ▽f j . However, the number of unknowns ▽f Remark 1: It is worth noting that if multiple adversary agents cooperate to infer the information of agent j, they can only establish a system of 2nK equations containing at least 3nK + n + 2 unknown variables as well. Therefore, our algorithm can protect the privacy of agents against multiple honest-but-curious adversaries and external eavesdroppers.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we rigorously prove the convergence of Algorithm I under the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Each local function f i : R n → R is strongly convex and continuously differentiable, i.e.,
In addition, there exists a lower bound m f > 0 such that m i ≥ 2m f , ∀i = {1, 2, . . . , N } is true. Assumption 2: Each private local function f i : R n → R has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e., is strongly convex and differentiable, i.e., Fig. 2 : Function-decomposition based privacy-preserving decentralized optimization equals to converting the original network into a virtual network
is strongly convex and differentiable, i.e.,
has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e. there exists an L < +∞ such that
has Lipschitz continuous gradients, i.e. there exists an L < +∞ such that Fig. 2 , we analyze the convergence of our algorithm based on the virtual network
. To simplify and unify the notations, we relabel the local objective functions f 
n is the edge-node incidence matrix of graph G ′ as defined in [34] . Parameter a m,l is defined as a m,l =    1 if the m th edge originates from agent l, −1 if the m th edge terminates at agent l, 0 otherwise.
We define each edge e i,j originating from i and terminating at j and denote an edge as e i,j ∈ E ′ if i < j is true or e j,i ∈ E ′ otherwise. Denote the iterating results in the kth step in Algorithm I as follows:
Further augment the coefficients γ i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 2N ) into the matrix form
and D i into the matrix form
Now we are in position to give the main results for this section:
Lemma 1: Let x * be the optimal solution, λ k * be the optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and
ρ I |E ′ |n }, and let u > 1 be an arbitrary constant, then we have
if U + D − A T A is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied. In (15) , x H = √x T Hx and
where Q max is the largest eigenvalue of Q, A min is the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of A T A, m f is the strongly convexity modulus, and L is the Lipschitz modulus.
Proof: The results can be obtained following a similar line of reasoning in [35] . The detailed proof is given in the supplementary materials and can be found online [36] .
Lemma 2: Let x * be the optimal solution, λ k * be the optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and
if U + D − A T A is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied. In (17) ,
Lemma 3: Let x * be the optimal solution, λ k * be the optimal multiplier to (14) at iteration k, and
if U + D − A T A is positive semi-definite and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.
Proof: Combining (15) and (17), we obtain the result directly.
Lemma 3 indicates that y k+1 − y k+1 * H converges linearly to a neighborhood of 0.
Theorem 2: Algorithm I is guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution to (14) 
T A is positive semidefinite and Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and Assumption 3 are satisfied.
Proof: The proof is provided in the Appendix. Remark 2: It is worth noting that problem (14) is a reformulation of problem (1) . So Theorem 2 guarantees that each agent's state will converge to the optimal solution to (1).
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We first present a numerical example to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed approach. Then we compare our approach with the differential-privacy based algorithm in [18] . We conducted numerical experiments on the following optimization problem.
with y i ∈ R n . Each agent i deals with a private local objective function
We used the above optimization problem (20) because it is easy to verify whether the obtained value is the optimal solution, which should be
. Furthermore, (20) makes it easy to compare with [18] , whose simulation is also based on (20) .
A. Evaluation of Our Approach
To solve the optimization problem (20) , f 
B. Comparison with the algorithm in [18]
Under the network deployment in Fig. 3 , we compared our privacy-preserving approach with the differential-privacy based algorithm in [18] . We simulated the algorithm in [18] under seven different privacy levels: ǫ = 0.2, 1, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100.
In the objective function (20) , y i was set to
The domain of optimization for the algorithm in [18] was set to X = {(x, y) ∈ R 2 |x 2 +y 2 ≤ 1}. Note that the optimal solution [0.35; 0.45] resided in X . Detailed parameter settings for the algorithm in [18] were given as n = 2, c = 0.5, q = 0.8, p = 0.9, and
for i = 1, 2, ..., 6. In addition, the performance index d in [18] was used to quantify the optimization error here, which was computed as the average value of squared distances with respect to the optimal solution over M runs [18] , i.e., VII. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to enabling privacy-preservation in decentralized optimization based on function decomposition, which neither compromises the optimality of optimization nor relies on an aggregator or third party. Theoretical analysis confirms that an honest-butcurious adversary cannot infer the information of neighboring agents even by recording and analyzing the information exchanged in multiple iterations. In addition, our approach can also avoid an external eavesdropper from inferring the information of participating agents. Numerical simulation results confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 2
From Lemma 3, we can obtain 
As a result of the convergence of h k , we have lim 
Therefore, we can obtain ∀ε = ε 1 > 0, ∃N = max{N 1 , N 2 },
which proves that lim 
